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COMES NOW Appellant, by and through his attorney of record, III Reply to the 
arguments made by the Respondent, in their brief filed December 15, 2011. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Appellant has produced evidence demonstrating that his activities of work probably 
caused his heart attack. 
Upon review of the Industrial Commission decision on appeal in this matter and upon the 
brief of the Respondents (hereinafter "Defendants"), it becomes clear that both the Industrial 
Commission and the Defendants in this case concede that the Appellant in this case (hereinafter 
"Claimant") provided evidence to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Claimant's 
activities after he arrived at work caused or contributed to the heart attack which he alleges 
occurred as a result of his work on November 15, 2009. 
The Industrial Commission indicated in its decision at paragraph 35 that evidence 
solicited by the Claimant and by the Defendants from Claimant's treating physician, Dr. Mark 
Parent, indicated that Claimant's heart attack occurred as a result of activities in which Claimant 
was involved after he got to work. (R p. 21, ~ 35). The Commission further noted that there was 
evidence in the record which supported this opinion. (R pp.l2-14). 
In their Response Brief, the Defendants agree that the Claimant offered evidence that the 
activities at work more probably than not contributed to the onset of his heart attack. (Resp't. Br. 
p. 8; Parent Depo., p. 48, 1. 25, p. 48, 11. 1-11). However, Defendants allege that the Industrial 
Commission was correct in not relying upon or believing these opinions and the Defendant urges 
the Court herein to affirm the Industrial Commission's decision. 
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Unquestionably, the cardiac processes precipitating a heart attack are complex. 
Defendants appear focused on this complexity as support for the Industrial Commission's 
discounting of a reliable expert medical opinion. In their brief, Defendants write, "And, as Dr. 
Parent testified, it is not possible to determine with any certainty when that process began." 
(Resp't. Br. p. 11, Parent Depo. p. 53, Is. 11-19). Indeed, that may not be scientifically possible. 
Yet, as argued more fully, infra, testimony to a medical certainty to prove causation has been 
soundly rejected as a legal standard in a workers' compensation case. Claimant contends that 
affirming the Commission's decision in this case would deviate from standing Idaho precedent 
with respect to proving causation in a workers' compensation case. 
B. The Industrial Commission erred by applying the wrong legal standard to the proof 
regarding causation. 
Claimant contends that the Industrial Commission's failure to adopt the opinion of Dr. 
Parent is based upon an inaccurate and incorrect application of the legal standards which apply to 
causation in this case. It is clear that the Industrial Commission's disbelief of Dr. Parent's 
opinion is based upon the fact that Dr. Parent did not rule out all other possible causes for 
Claimant's heart attack. The Industrial Commission noted at paragraph 41 of its decision, that 
because Dr. Parent had failed to rule out other possible causes of the Claimant's heart attack, his 
opinion lacked foundation and was materially flawed. (R p. 23, ~ 41). 
In other passages of the Industrial Commission decision, it is clear that the Commission's 
view of the evidence required Claimant to offer evidence which is beyond that required by the 
legal standard which applies in this case. In paragraph 23, and later in paragraph 42, the 
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Industrial Commission indicated that Dr. Parent's testimony was flawed because he was unable 
to pinpoint that event which made Appellant's heart attack inevitable. 
"However, though mindful of all of these facts, Dr. Parent was 
unable to opine which of these activities/events made it inevitable 
that Claimant would suffer the November 15 thrombosis when he 
did." 
(R pp. 17-18, ~ 23). 
Based upon these perceived inadequacies in Dr. Parent's testimony, the Industrial 
Commission found in paragraph 42 of its decision that Dr. Parent's testimony was insufficient to 
establish that Claimant's post-arrival activities were responsible for causing or contributing to 
the occurrence of Claimant's myocardial infarction. Further, the Industrial Commission noted 
that the evidence just as easily supports the proposition that it was something that happened prior 
to Claimant's arrival at the work site that made his heart attack inevitable and caused it to occur 
when and how it did. (R pp. 23-24, ~ 42). 
Claimant contends that in these statements, it is clear that the Industrial Commission 
required Claimant to satisfy a legal standard with regard to causation which does not apply in 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission or proceedings before any other Court in this 
State. 
Defendants, in their brief, allege that Claimant has misconstrued the Industrial 
Commission's reasoning and that the Industrial Commission did indeed apply the correct 
standard of causation in this case. Claimant contends that if the reasoning behind the Industrial 
Commission's interpretation of the causation evidence in this case is closely examined, it is clear 
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that the Industrial Commission was requiring the Appellant to satisfy a "but for" standard of 
causation and prove that the Claimant's work-related activities were the only cause of his injury. 
It is to be remembered that the claimant in a worker's compensation case does not have to 
prove that the work accident or activities were the only cause of the injury complained of. As 
Claimant noted in his Opening Brief, the law on this point is well stated in Bowman v. Twin Falls 
Construction Company, 99 Idaho 312, 581 P .2d 770 (1978) and DeMain v. Bruce McLaughlin 
Logging, 132 Idaho 782, 979 P.2d 655 (1999), in which the Industrial Commission and this 
Court found that a claimant in a worker's compensation case only needs to prove that his work 
related activities or work accident were a factor in leading to his injury and disability. 
In District Court proceedings, the law is equally clear holding that the standard of proof 
on causation only requires that the plaintiff show that the accident was a substantial factor in 
causing the injury complained of. Such a cause can be a substantial contributing cause even 
though the injury, damage or loss would have occurred anyway without that contributing factor. 
A substantial cause need not be the sole factor or even the primary factor in the injury but merely 
a substantial factor. See, Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005); Garcia v. 
Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819 (2007). 
Applying that law to the Industrial Commission's decision herein, the fallacy of the 
Commission's reasoning is well illustrated. The Industrial Commission found that because Dr. 
Parent had failed to factor in non-work related activities, then his opinion was not to be believed. 
(R p. 18, ~ 24). Indeed, the Industrial Commission totally disregarded the opinion of Dr. Parent 
with regard to causation based upon these perceived weaknesses. The Industrial Commission 
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discussed, at some length, evidence which indicated that the Claimant appeared to feel unwell at 
the time he first arrived at work and indicated that because Dr. Parent did not take this factor into 
account, his opinion could not be given any weight and was without foundation. (R pp. 17-18, 
~~ 23-24; R pp. 23-24, ~~ 41-42). 
The reasoning of the Industrial Commission therefore appears to be that if there were 
other possible non-work related causes of Claimant's heart attack on the morning of November 
15, 2009, then the work-related activities which were also factors in Claimant's heart attack 
which occurred that morning could not have been a proximate cause of his injury. As such, the 
Industrial Commission's logic requires the Claimant to prove that the work related activities in 
which Appellant was engaged on the morning of November 15,2009, were the only cause of his 
injury. 
This faulty legal standard permeates the Commission's decision. In repeated passages, 
the Industrial Commission's reasoning requires Claimant to prove that but for specific work 
related activities, Claimant's heart attack would not have been inevitable. At paragraph 23 of the 
Industrial Commission decision, the decision notes as follows: 
"However, Dr Parent was much more circumspect about 
identifying the event or events which made the occurrence of the 
blockage inevitable. It is impossible, in other words, to say 
whether the inciting events which led to the plaque rupture 
occurred prior to Claimant's arrival on the premises, or subsequent 
thereto." 
(R p. 17-18, ~ 23). 
Claimant contends that this statement clearly and unequivocally requires Claimant to 
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satisfy a "but for" standard of proof. Claimant was held to a standard of demonstrating that a 
work related activity caused the heart attack to be inevitable. Claimant contends that this is an 
incorrect legal standard. The correct causation standard only requires Claimant to prove that the 
work related activities were a factor or a substantial factor in making the heart attack inevitable. 
As it stands, Claimant has been deprived of the benefit of the correct legal standard. 
Claimant further contends that even if one assumes that all of the non-work related 
factors listed and discussed by the Industrial Commission were factors in causing Claimant's 
heart attack, the work related factors discussed by Dr. Parent were still a substantial factor in 
leading to his heart attack on the morning of November 15, 2009. Indeed, Dr. Parent offered 
testimony delineating his opinion about these other non-work related causes and this opinion was 
discussed by the Industrial Commission in its decision. As the Court herein may recall, defense 
counsel corresponded with Dr. Parent prior to the hearing in this case and requested Dr. Parent to 
consider non-work related factors for Claimant's injury. Dr. Parent did so and wrote back to 
defense counsel indicating that Claimant's preexisting conditions may have been responsible for 
fifty percent of the reason for Claimant's injury, while Claimant's work related activities 
constituted the other fifty percent causation contribution. (R pp. 13-14, ~ 20). 
Claimant contends that a fifty percent work-related contribution is a substantial factor in 
the causation of Claimant's heart attack and the Industrial Commission erred in disregarding this 
opinion totally. Specifically, the Industrial Commission erred in discounting Dr. Parent's 
opinion on causation simply because there may have been other possible causes which could 
have contributed to the Claimant's heart attack. 
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The Industrial Commission's decision to disregard the opinion offered by Dr. Parent, 
therefore, is contrary to the law set forth in Newberry, supra, and Garcia, supra, and should be 
reversed on that ground. 
C. The Industrial Commission's denial of benefits is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
As noted above, the Defendants in this case admit that Dr. Parent's opinion, as solicited 
by the Claimant, was sufficient to prove his case and constituted substantial and competent 
evidence to support the allegation made by the Claimant that his heart attack was caused by 
activities of his work on the morning of November 15,2009. (Resp't. Br. p. 8; Parent Depo., p. 
48,1. 25, p. 48, 11. 1-11). 
Having made that admission, it appears clear that the burden of proof of discounting that 
opinion offered by Dr. Parent devolves to the Defendants. The Defendants therefore carry the 
burden of proof to disprove the opinion of Dr. Parent. 
In their brief, the Defendants do not address the burden of proof issue in any manner but 
simply argue that the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits was supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. Claimant continues to contend that the reasons chosen by the Industrial 
Commission to disbelieve Dr. Parent's opinion were not medically significant and do not 
constitute substantial and competent evidence. Many of the issues chosen by the Industrial 
Commission were previously addressed by the parties and were found to be medically 
insignificant by Dr. Parent. 
Specifically, Claimant's appearance at the time he arrived at work and his pre-arrival 
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activities were fully addressed by defense counsel in the deposition of Dr. Parent and he 
indicated that although these factors may have played some role in Claimant's health history, 
these factors did not lead him to change his opinion that Claimant's heart attack was precipitated 
by events which occurred after the Claimant arrived at work and was exerting himself 
strenuously in cold weather. Claimant has previously discussed these points in his Opening 
Brief at pages 26, 27 and 28 and will not reiterate those points again. Suffice it to say that the 
Industrial Commission's reliance upon this evidence is misplaced and in this regard, the 
Industrial Commission has erred. 
Defendants' brief also talks about the timing of the onset of symptoms and mirrors the 
Industrial Commission's decision on this particular point. Again, Claimant contends that the 
timing issue was specifically addressed by Dr. Parent and led him to conclude that it was 
Claimant's activities after he arrived at work that specifically led to the heart attack which 
Claimant suffered. 
"I don't think that artery closed when he was getting in the car that 
morning or when he drove from Caldwell to Boise. I think it 
closed when he was walking up those stairs, and it hit him very 
suddenly. 
For you to ask me what's the contribution of the cold morning 
getting in the car and the drive to Boise is for me too fine a point to 
be so accurate and to give you an opinion on what contribution I 
just can't give that." 
(Parent Depo. p. 55, 11. 15-24). 
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In the face of this testimony, the Industrial Commission found at paragraph 23 of its 
decision as follows: 
"It is impossible, in other words, to say whether the inciting events 
that led to the plaque rupture occurred prior to Claimant's arrival 
on the premises, or subsequent thereto." 
(Rp.17,~23). 
Claimant contends that in making this conclusion, the Industrial Commission has not 
only misconstrued the testimony of Dr. Parent, they have relied upon evidence which was 
dismissed by Dr. Parent as being medically inconsequential. In addition, the Industrial 
Commission is relying upon assumptions and conjecture which is not supported by medical 
evidence in the record. Even though the Defendants failed in their obligation to offer substantial 
and competent evidence which undermined Dr. Parent's opinion which established that 
Claimant's work-related activities were a factor in leading to his heart attack, the Industrial 
Commission still assumed that many of the same factors discussed by Defendants and dismissed 
by the Doctor were enough to undermine Dr. Parent's opinion. These assumptions, as discussed 
above, were all made without the benefit of substantial and competent evidence to support them. 
Claimant therefore contends that the Industrial Commission's opinion denying benefits must be 
reversed because it is not based on substantial and competent evidence. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
DATED This ~ day of December, 2011. 
Richard S. Owen 
David M. Farney 
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